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Abstract—The notion of Local Differential Privacy (LDP)
enables users to answer sensitive questions while preserving their
privacy. The basic LDP frequent oracle protocol enables the
aggregator to estimate the frequency of any value. But when the
domain of input values is large, finding the most frequent values,
also known as the heavy hitters, by estimating the frequencies of
all possible values, is computationally infeasible. In this paper,
we propose an LDP protocol for identifying heavy hitters. In our
proposed protocol, which we call Prefix Extending Method (PEM),
users are divided into groups, with each group reporting a prefix
of her value. We analyze how to choose optimal parameters for
the protocol and identify two design principles for designing LDP
protocols with high utility. Experiments on both synthetic and
real-world datasets demonstrate the advantage of our proposed
protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, differential privacy [11], [12] has been
increasingly accepted as the de facto standard for data pri-
vacy in the research community [3], [13], [20], [22], [27].
Recently, techniques for satisfying differential privacy (DP)
in the local setting, which we call LDP, have been deployed.
Such techniques enable gathering of statistics while preserving
privacy of every user, without relying on trust in a single
data curator. For example, researchers from Google developed
RAPPOR [14], [17], which is included as part of Chrome. It
enables Google to collect users’ answers to questions such as
the default homepage of the browser, the default search engine,
and so on, to understand the unwanted or malicious hijacking
of user settings. Apple [1] also uses similar methods to help
with predictions of spelling and other things, but the details of
the algorithm are not public yet. Samsung proposed a similar
system [26] which enables collection of not only categorical
answers (e.g., screen resolution) but also numerical answers
(e.g., time of usage, battery volume), although it is not clear
whether this has been deployed by Samsung.
In the LDP setting, each user possesses an input value
v ∈ D, and the aggregator wants to learn the distribution
of the input values among all users. Existing research [6],
[14], [30] has developed frequency oracle protocols, where
the aggregator can estimate the frequency of any chosen
value v ∈ D. When the size of D is small, such frequency
oracle protocols can be used to efficiently reconstruct a noisy
approximation of the input distribution. When the size of D
is so large that issuing an oracle query for each value in it is
computationally infeasible, one needs an additional protocol
that first identifies a set of candidate frequent values. Two
protocols for doing this exist [6], [17].
In this paper, we propose the Prefix Extending Method
(PEM), which is conceptually very simple, and yet is able to
provide much better accuracy than existing protocols, and the
advantage is more pronounced as the size ofD gets larger. The
basic idea of PEM is to gradually identifying longer and longer
frequent prefixes. For example, if we view D as consisting of
length-m binary strings, we divide the users into g groups,
where users in each group report a prefix of a certain length.
Users in the j + 1’th group report prefixes of length η longer
than the j’th group, and the g’th group report the whole string.
Thus the population is divided into g groups of roughly the
same size. The aggregator uses reports from the first group to
finds C1, the set of frequent prefixes, and then uses reports
from the second group to find C2, considering candidates that
have prefixes in C1. The aggregator iterates this process until
finding the set of frequent values.
An important parameter in this process is the segment
length η. Larger η would mean higher computational cost.
In terms of utility, larger η means fewer groups and more
users in each group, which improves utility. However, larger η
means more candidates to consider in each step, which leads
to lower accuracy. We conduct an utility analysis to study the
interactions of these two effects. The utility analysis enables
us to draw to a conclusion that the first effect dominates
the second, and thus larger η results in better utility. Thus
the choice of η depends on limitation on the computational
resources. Because of the complexity of the problem, we have
to make several simplifying approximations in the analysis. To
validate the analysis, we accompany each step of the analysis
with empirical experiment to show that conclusions drawn
from the analysis match empirical ones.
With the analysis, we are able to identify two design
principles. The first is, when asking multiple questions, it is
better to partition the users into groups, and having each group
answer one question, as opposed to having each user answer
all the questions splitting the privacy budget. The second is,
one should reduce the number of groups as much as possible
when designing LDP protocols, as larger group size is a key
in achieving accuracy. Some existing protocols violate these
principles, and can be improved by following them. We expect
these principles to guide the design of LDP protocols for other
problems.
Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of PEM by
conducting experiments with both synthetic and real-world
datasets. Result shows that PEM greatly outperforms existing
solutions.
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
• We provide new solutions for the privacy-preserving
heavy hitter problem. The protocol is then analyzed
and optimized.
• We identify two principles that can guide the design
of protocols for other LDP problems.
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of our solution using
real-world and synthetic datasets.
Roadmap. In Section II, we present LDP and describe
existing mechanisms. We then go over the problem definition
and existing solutions in Section III. Section IV presents
our proposed method and analysis. The analysis is validated
in Section V. Experiment results are given in VI. Finally
we discuss related work in Section VII and conclude in
Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
We consider a setting where there are many users and one
aggregator. Each user possesses an input value v ∈ D, and
the aggregator wants to learn (and use) the distribution of the
input values among all users, in a way that protects the privacy
of individual users.
In the standard (or centralized) setting, each user sends v to
the aggregator, which obtains a histogram for the distribution,
and can add noises to the histogram to satisfy differential
privacy, so that each individual user’s input has a limited
impact on the output. In this setting, the aggregator sees the
raw input from all users and is trusted to handle these private
data correctly.
A. Differential Privacy in Local Setting
In the local (or distributed) setting, we want to remove
the need to trust the aggregator. To achieve this, each user
perturbs the input value v using an algorithm π and sends
π(v) to the aggregator. The formal privacy requirement is that
the algorithm π(·) satisfies local differential privacy, defined
as follows:
Definition 1 (Local Differential Privacy): An algorithm π
satisfies ǫ-local differential privacy (ǫ-LDP), where ǫ ≥ 0, if
and only if for any input v1, v2 ∈ D, we have
∀T ⊆Range(π) : Pr [π(v1) ∈ T ] ≤ eǫ Pr [π(v2) ∈ T ] ,
where Range(π) denotes the set of all possible outputs of the
algorithm π.
For an algorithm π(·) to satisfy ǫ-LDP, it must be random-
ized. Compared to the centralized setting, the local version of
DP offers a stronger level of protection, because each user only
reports the perturbed data. Each user’s privacy is still protected
even if the aggregator is malicious.
B. Frequency Oracles
A protocol that satisfies LDP is specified by two algo-
rithms: π, which is used by each user to perturb her input
value, and Γ, which takes as input the reports from all users,
and outputs the desired information. A basic protocol under
LDP is to estimate the frequency of any given value v ∈ D.
In which a protocol, Γ outputs an oracle that can be queried
for the frequency of each value. We thus call such a protocol
a frequency oracle protocol.
We assume that there are n users, and user j’s value is
vj ∈ D, and the domain size is |D| = d.
1) Generalized Randomized Response (GRR): One fre-
quency oracle protocol generalizes the randomized response
technique [31]. In this protocol, πGRR(v) outputs the value
v with probability p = e
ǫ
eǫ+d−1 , and each value v
′ 6= v with
probability 1−pd−1 =
1
eǫ+d−1 =
p
eǫ . In the special case where
the value is one bit, i.e., when d = 2, πGRR(v) keeps the bit
unchanged with probability e
ǫ
eǫ+1 and flips it with probability
1
eǫ+1 .
The frequency oracle outputted by ΓGRR in this protocol
works as follows. To estimate the frequency of v, it counts
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how many times v is reported and obtains Iv , and then
outputs Iv−nqp−q . That is, the frequency estimate is a linear
transformation of the noisy count Iv , in order to account for
the effect of randomized response. In [30], it is shown that this
is an unbiased estimation of the true count, and the variance
for this estimation is
d− 2 + eǫ
(eǫ − 1)2 · n. (1)
The accuracy of this protocol deteriorates fast when the
domain size d increases. The larger d is, the lower the
probability that a value is preserved. This is reflected in the
fact that the variance of is linear in d. For example, when
ǫ = ln 49, with d = 216, we have p = 4965584 ≈ 0.00075, and
variance 655832304 ≈ 28.5n
More sophisticated frequency estimators have been studied
before [6], [14], [30]. In [30], several such protocols are
analyzed, optimized, and compared against each other, and it
was found that when d is large, the Optimized Local Hashing
(OLH) protocol provides the best accuracy while maintaining
a low communication cost. In this paper, we use the OLH
protocol as a primitive and describe it below.
2) Optimized Local Hashing (OLH) [30]: The Optimized
Local Hashing (OLH) protocol deals with a large domain size
d by first using a hash function to map an input value into a
smaller domain of size d′, typically d′ << d, and then applies
randomized response to the value in the smaller domain. In
this protocol, both the hashing step and the randomization step
result in information loss. The choice of the parameter d′ is
a tradeoff between losing information during the hashing step
and losing information during the randomization step. In [30],
it is found that the optimal choice of d′ is eǫ + 1.
In OLH, πOLH(v) = 〈H, πGRR(H(v)〉, where H is
randomly chosen from a family of hash functions that hash
each value inD to {1 . . . d′}, where d′ = ⌈eǫ+1⌉, and πGRR is
the perturb algorithm used in generalized randomized response,
with probability p = e
ǫ
eǫ+d′−1 .
The frequency oracle outputted by ΓOLH in this protocol
works as follows. Let 〈Hj , yj〉 be the report from the j’th
user. For each value v ∈ D, the oracle first computes Iv =
|{j | Hj(v) = yj}|. That is, Iv is the number of reports that
“supports” that the input is v. The oracle then outputs
Iv − n/d′
p− 1/d′ . (2)
The variance of this estimation is
4eǫ
(eǫ − 1)2 · n. (3)
Compared with (1), the factor d − 2 + eǫ is replaced by 4eǫ.
This suggests that for smaller d, one is better off with GRR;
but for large d, OLH is better and has a variance that does not
depend on d.
We point out that using OLH, each invocation of the
frequency oracle takes time linear in the population size.
Furthermore, the computations needed for recovering the fre-
quency of one value are independent from those needed for
recovering that of another value.
The importance of group size. One may notice that the above
frequency oracles under LDP all have estimation variance that
is linear in n, which means that the standard deviation of the
estimations is linear in
√
n. This is shared by all protocols
under LDP, and is a fundamental accuracy cost one has to pay
in order to achieve LDP [8]. What this means, however, is that
LDP protocols can be useful only when the group size n is
large, and LDP protocols are meaningful only for the frequent
values.
We now use some concrete numbers to make these points
clear. For example, to recover a value that is possessed by
0.1% of the population, we have the true count being 0.001n.
Assuming we choose ǫ such that eǫ = 10, then using OLH the
standard deviation is
√
40
81n ≈ 0.7
√
n. If we desire that the
true count is at least 3 times the standard deviation, then we
require 0.001n ≥ 3× 0.7√n, or n ≥ 4, 410, 000. This suggest
that with about 4.5 million users, we can recover meaningful
frequencies for values that appear in at least 0.1% of the
population. Quadrupling the population size would enables
us to reduce this 0.1% sensitivity threshold by half. While
theoretically there are up to 1000 values with frequencies 0.1%
or higher, in most distributions there are likely no more than
a few dozen of such values, because the most frequent values
will appear with frequencies far higher than 0.1% and the total
frequencies of infrequent values can also be substantial.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND EXISTING METHODS
Recall that the aggregator wants to know the distribution
of the frequent values. When the data domain D is relatively
small, having a frequency oracle protocol suffices, as the
aggregator can invoke the frequency oracle for all values in D,
and identify the frequent ones. However, in many applications,
the data domain D is very large, e.g., 2128 when the input
values have 16 bytes. Enumerating through all values in them
is computationally infeasible.
In this paper we focus on the problem of identifying fre-
quent values under the LDP setting when the input domain is
large. For simplicity, we assume that each value is represented
by a binary string of length m, although our method can
be easily changed to support more complicated structure of
values, such as a value consisting of multiple components.
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A. Problem Definition
The problem of finding frequent values (heavy hitters) can
be defined either as identifying the top-k values or finding
values that appear above a certain threshold. We assume that
each user has a single value, and thus each frequency threshold
can be approximately translated into a k value. Also, note that
when the population size n and the privacy budget ǫ is set, the
number of threshold above which one can estimate frequencies
accurately is more or less fixed. We use the top-k version of
definition.
Definition 2 (Top-k Heavy Hitter.): Given a multi-set
{{v1, v2 . . . , vn}} ∈ Dn. An element x ∈ D is a top-k heavy
hitter if its frequency fx =
|{j|j∈[n]∧vj=x}|
n is ranked among
top k frequencies of all possible values.
Suppose that each user has a length m = 128 binary string
v as input value, the naive approach of querying the frequency
of each string requires 2128 oracle queries and is infeasible.
The goal is to identify a set of candidates from the domain D,
such that it is computationally feasible to query the frequency
oracle.
B. Strawman Method
To better understand the protocols proposed in [6], [17], we
start by describing a strawman method for identifying a smaller
set of candidates for frequent values. An intuitive method is to
divide and conquer. Specifically, a length-m value is divided
into g equal-size segments, each of length s = m/g. For
example, when g = 8,m = 128, each segment has s = 16
bits. Borrowing Python list syntax, we use the notation v[i : j]
to denote the segment of v starting at the i’th bit and stopping
at (and including) the j − 1’th bit. Thus v[0 : m] represents
the complete v.
In the strawman protocol, each user randomly chooses
a segment to report. More specifically, the user randomly
chooses 1 ≤ α ≤ g, and reports
〈π(v), α, π(v[(α − 1)s : αs])〉,
where π can be any perturb function, although it is natural to
use OLH. That is, the whole population is divided (by their
own random choices) into g groups, each reporting on one
segment.
The aggregator first queries the frequency of each length-s
binary string in each of the g segments, issuing a total of 2s×g
oracle queries, and identifying the frequent patterns in each
segment. Let C1, . . . , Cg denote the frequent patterns for the
g segments. The candidate set C is the Cartesian product of Ci,
i.e., C = C1×C2×. . .×Cg , where Cartesian product operation
× is defined as Ci × Cj = {ci||cj : ci ∈ Ci, cj ∈ Cj}, and
|| is the string concatenation operation. Finally, the aggregator
queries frequencies of these candidates, using the full string
reports π(v).
The main shortcoming of this method is that, if we identify
k candidates from each of C1, . . . , Cg , the candidate set C
has size kg. When m is large, g is not very small, and
the candidate set C is still too large to be enumerated. The
protocols proposed in [6], [17] can be viewed as taking two
different approaches in further improving this method.
C. The Segment Pairs Method (SPM) [17]
The approach taken by Google’s team for the RAPPOR
system improves upon the above strawman protocol by having
each user report a pair of two randomly chosen segments, in-
stead of reporting only one segment. We call this the Segment
Pair Method (SPM).
In SPM, the length-m value is divided into g segments of
length s = m/g. In addition to reporting the overall value v,
a user also randomly chooses two segments to report. More
specifically, the user randomly chooses 1 ≤ α 6= β ≤ g, and
reports
〈π(v), α, β, π(v[(α − 1)s : αs]), π(v[(β − 1)s : βs])〉.
That is, the user runs three reporting protocols in parallel, each
using one third of privacy budget. Since each user randomly
chooses 2 out of g segments to report, the population is divided
into
(
g
2
)
groups, each reporting for one pair of segments. When
n users are reporting, one expects that about ng/2 users report
on each segment, and about ng(g−1)/2 users report each pair of
segments.
The aggregator first identifies the frequent patterns in each
of the g segments. Then, it queries, for each pair 1 ≤ i, j ≤ g
of segments, the frequency for the values in Ci × Cj and
identifies the value pairs that are frequent in segments i, j.
From the frequent value pairs for each pair of segments,
the aggregator recovers candidates for frequent values for the
whole domain, using the a priori principle that if a value v ∈ D
is frequent, every pair of its segments must also be frequent.
Because of this filtering by segment pairs, the size of C is
typically small enough to query the frequency of each value
in it.
The main limitation of this method is that, since the
length of each segment must be relatively small (one needs to
enumerate through all possible values for each segment), when
the domain is large, there are too many pairs of segments. As
a result, the number of users reporting on each location-pair is
limited, making it difficult to accurately identify frequent value
pairs. For example, when g = 8, each pair has only about n28
users. And when g = 16, each pair has only about n120 users.
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(a) Strawman : Users par-
titioned into
(
4
1
)
= 4
groups, each reporting
one segment
(b) SPM: Users parti-
tioned into
(
4
2
)
= 6
groups, each reporting
one pair of segments.
(c) MCM: Users partitioned into
64 groups, each reporting one
bit on multiple channels.
(d) PEM: Users parti-
tioned into 4 groups, each
reporting a prefix.
Fig. 1. Illustration of how candidate frequent values are generated by different methods. Assuming that each value has 64 bits, often divided into 4 segments
of 16-bits each. The first three methods require in addition the ability of to estimate the frequency of any value in the whole domain. In SPM and MCM, this
is done by having each user report both the segments in the figure and the whole value, dividing the privacy budget. We show that it is better to divide the
population to have another group of users who report only the whole value. In PEM, the last group serves the purpose.
D. The Multiple Channel Method (MCM) [6]
Bassily and Smith proposed an approach which we call
Multiple Channel Method (MCM) [6]. Our description of MCM
below simplifies that in [6], and is equivalent to it. This
approach can be viewed as improving upon the strawman
approach by using a technique to separate the values into
multiple channels so that with high probability each channel
has at most one frequent value, and then identifying this
candidate frequent value by identifying each bit of it.
The approach uses a hash function H that maps each input
value v to an integer in {1 . . . h}. We say that v is mapped
to the channel H(v). The value h needs to be large enough
to ensure that the probability that any two frequent values are
mapped to the same channel is low. Each user with input v
randomly selects ℓ such that 0 ≤ ℓ < m and reports:
〈π(v), ℓ, b1, b2, · · · , bh〉
The privacy budget ǫ is divided into two parts ǫ1 + ǫ2 = ǫ.
Sending the value v uses ǫ1; b1, b2, · · · bh are computed such
that when j 6= H(v), b is a randomly sampled bit, and when
j = H(v), b is a perturbed value of the v[ℓ], flipped with
probability q = 1eǫ2+1 . That is, each user chooses one of the
m bit to report.
From each channel, the aggregator extracts a candidate
frequent value by taking the majority vote for each bit. The
aggregator then queries the frequency of these candidates and
outputs the frequent values.
One main limitation of this approach is that since each
user reports a single bit, only a small number of users are
reporting for each bit. For example, with m = 128, only
n
128 users participate in the determination of candidate for
each bit. Furthermore, to correctly recover the candidate value,
each of the 128 bits must be recovered correctly. (While error
correction code is suggested in [6], that will further reduce
the group size and increase the probability that any one bit
is recovered correctly.) This limitation can be addressed by
having each user report a bigger block (such as 16 bit) at a
time, which does improve the accuracy.
Another limitation is that since one identifies a single
candidate from each channel, each user has to report on
multiple channels, and the oracle queries must be made on
all h channels. This adds a multiplicative factor of h to the
communication and computation overheads.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In both SPM and MCM, to deal with the challenge of large
domains, a bit string input is divided into non-overlapping
segments so that one can recover frequent patterns in each
segment. These patterns need to be combined into a set of
candidate frequent values. SPM does this by making each user
report a pair of segments, dividing the population into
(
g
2
)
groups. MCM does this by using multiple channels so that within
each channel one focuses on identifying a single candidate
frequent value.
We observe that instead of dividing a bit string into non-
overlapping segments, one can have these segments overlap-
ping. In our proposed method, which we call Prefix Extending
Method (PEM), users in each group report a prefix of her value.
Figure 1 illustrates the differences between the four methods
we have discussed. The main advantage of PEM over other
methods is that when m is long, one needs to divide the
population only into g groups.
A. Prefix Extending Method (PEM)
The PEM method is parameterized by two parameters γ and
η, which are positive integers. A user is randomly assigned into
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one of g groups, where g = ⌈m−γη ⌉. The assignment can be
made by the aggregator, or having each user selecting a group
at random. Users in the i’th group where 1 ≤ i ≤ g report
〈i, π(v[0 : γ + iη])〉.
Let D1 = {0, 1}γ+η, the aggregator uses the first group’s
reports to identify which values in D1 are frequent prefixes.
Let C1 be the result. It then constructs D2 = C1 × {0, 1}η,
which are candidates for longer frequent prefixes, and uses the
second group’s reports to identify the frequent ones in D2 as
C2. This continues until the last step where Cg gives the set
of frequent values.
Note that here we assume that we have no domain knowl-
edge about the underlying values and thus represent the values
as bit strings and divide it into equal-length segments. The
basic idea of PEM, where one iteratively find portions of
the whole values that are frequent, can be applied in other
contexts. In a given application, one can take advantage of
domain-specific knowledge to define segments differently. For
example, one can use the domain knowledge to eliminate
candidates that are impossible. If the values have internal
structures such as one component can have values of different
lengths, one can also extend that component in one step and
test values of different lengths. In this paper, we focus on the
binary string setting.
B. Protocol Analysis
The PEM protocol has two parameters γ and η. Typically,
γ should be slightly larger than η, to make the candidate
set size roughly the same in each step. The choice of η,
however, is very important. Larger η would mean higher
computational cost. Furthermore, by having a large η, there
will be fewer groups, and thus more users in each group,
making the estimation in each step more accurate; on the other
hand, there will be more values to consider in each step, thus
the probability a non-heavy hitter is identified is increased. We
now analyze the utility to optimize the choice of η.
1) Metric: To compare utility when using different η
values, we use the following utility measurements.
F-measure (F1). Define vj as the j-th most frequent value.
The ground truth for top k values is CT = {v1, v2, . . . , vk}.
Denote the k values identified by the protocol using Cg . CT ∩
Cg is the set of real top-k values that are identified by the
protocol, and CT ∪ Cg is the union of the two sets. We use
the widely used F-measure [23] which is the harmonic mean
of precision and recall, i.e.,
F1 =
2
1/P + 1/R
=
2PR
P +R
where P =
|CT ∩ Cg|
|Cg| , R =
|CT ∩ Cg|
|CT |
We note that when |CT | = |Cg|, the precision P equals
the recall R, and the F-measure equals the precision, as well
as 1 minus the false negative rate.
Normalized Cumulative Rank (NCR). The F-measure
uses only the unordered set CT as the ground truth. As a result,
missing the value with the highest frequency is penalized
the same as missing any others. To address this limitation,
we assign a quality function q(·) to each value, and use the
Normalized Cumulative Gain (NCG) metric [19]:
NCG =
∑
v∈Cg
q(v)∑
v∈CT
q(v)
.
We instantiate the quality function using v’s rank as
follows: the highest ranked value has a score of k (i.e.,
q(v1) = k), the next one has score k − 1, and so on; the k-th
value has a score of 1, and all other values have scores of 0.
To normalize this into a value between 0 and 1, we divide the
sum of scores by the maximum possible score, i.e.,
k(k+1)
2 .
This gives rise to what we call the Normalized Cumulative
Rank (NCR); this metric uses the true rank information of the
top-k values.
Both F-measure and NCR are in the range [0.0, 1.0], where
higher values indicate better accuracy. We present results using
these metrics and observe that the correlation among them is
quite stable.
Unified Utility Score. We express the utility scores as
the weighted average of the identification probability of each
heavy hitter, that is,
k∑
j=1
(
wj ·
g∏
i=1
Pidenj [i]
)
, (4)
where Pidenj [i] is the identification probability for the j-th
most frequent value vj in step i, that is, vj [0 : γ + iη] ∈ Ci.
We will elaborate Pidenj [i] later. The overall identification
probability is the product of that of each phase.
Different metrics can be expressed by different weights. In
the F-measure, wj =
1
k , and for NCR, where the higher ranked
value receives greater weight, wj =
k+1−j
∑
k
l=1 k+1−l
.
In our analysis below, we assume that the identification of
the heavy hitters are mutually-independent. Technically this is
not true. If one value has been identified as a heavy bitter,
the probability that another one is identified will be slightly
lower, since we are identifying k heavy hitters. However, when
k is not very small, this effect is small and can be ignored for
our purpose. We will empirically verify the correctness of this
approximation.
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2) Assumptions and Constraints: We first simplify PEM
by initiate some parameters. Recall that there are two main
parameters γ, η in PEM. Users are partitioned into g = ⌈m−γη ⌉
groups. We assume that the number of users in all groups
are the same; thus, the number of users in the i’th group is
n[i] = n/g. We fix the size of output in each stage to be
|Ci| = k. We further fix γ = ⌈log2 k⌉. Thus the aggregator
makes |Di| = 2γ+η = k · 2η queries to the frequency oracle
in each step, and the only parameter left for us to choose is η.
To calculate the actual utility scores, we have to make
some assumptions of the dataset distribution. This is because
the significance (frequency) of the heavy hitters will affect
the utility measure. For example, in an almost uniformly
distributed dataset, it is hard to find out the most frequent
k values, since the frequency differences are very small. We
also limit the maximum allowed number of frequency oracle
queries.
3) Approximate Identification Probability: We now calcu-
late Pidenj [i], the probability vj’s prefix is identified in step
i, i.e., vj [0 : γ + iη] ∈ Ci.
We first show the estimation of a value is a random
variable. Assume the true frequency of vj is fj . n[i] = n/g
users are randomly assigned to report the first γ + iη bits of
their private value, and each of them possesses the value vj
with probability fj . By (2), estimation of vj is only determined
by the “support”, Ij , it receives. Since we only care about the
relative ranks of the estimations, we focus on Ij and use it
as estimation of vj . For each user, if he has value vj (with
probability fj), his report will “support” vj (reports H
j(vj)
in terms of OLH) with probability p; otherwise his report will
“support” vj with probability q = 1/d
′. Therefore, Ij can
be seen as the summation of n[i] binomial variables, whose
probability of being 1 is pj = p · fj + q · (1 − fj). In most
cases (as long as n[i] is large), we can approximate Ij using
normal distribution with mean µj [i] = n[i] · pj and variance
σ2j [i] = n[i] · pj · (1 − pj).
We then calculate the probability vj [0 : γ+iη]’s estimation
is ranked on top k. Since Ij is a normal random variable, we
know the probability a value is estimated above any threshold
value T , that is, Pr [Ij > T ]. For all the non-heavy hitters,
summing this up gives us the expected number of values that
are estimated above T . If this expected number is less than
k, then Pr [Ij > T ] is the probability its estimation is ranked
on top k. We use Tk[i] to denote this threshold value. For
efficiency, we assume that among all the values to be tested,
Di, all the N [i] = |Di|−k = k(2η−1) non-heavy values have
zero frequencies (this is especially safe when N [i] is large).
Therefore, Tk[i] can be calculated by the inverse of cumulative
density function:
Tk[i] =− Φ−1
(
k
N [i]
)
· σ0[i] + µ0[i]
where σ20 [i] = n[i] · q · (1 − q), µ0[i] = n[i] · q denotes the
variance and mean of these N [i] zero-mean values.
Finally, we account for the effect of other heavy hitters.
We assume the estimations of the top k values are always
sorted, thus for the j-th value to be estimated top k, there are
k − j + 1 slots, since the top j − 1 values are already ranked
higher. Formally,
Pidenj [i] =1− Φ
(
Tk−j [i]− µj [i]
σj [i]
)
= Φ
(
µj [i]− Tk−j [i]
σj [i]
)
=Φ

µj [i] + Φ−1
(
k−j
N [i]
)
· σ0[i]− µ0[i]
σj [i]

 (5)
C. Instantiate PEM
With (5) to instantiate (4), we can now calculate the
utility scores when using different values for η. Before the
actual numerical computation, we need to assume the dataset
distribution. For instance, we can assume that the users’ value
form a zipf’s distribution, i.e., fj ∝ 1j . We also need to limit
the number of total queries to the frequency estimator, e.g.,
220 queries.
The optimization inputs are: k as the number of desired
heavy hitters, m as the domain size in bits, n as the number
of users, and ǫ as the privacy budget. With all parameters
available, η is instantiated with different values and the corre-
sponding utility scores are calculated. The configuration that
gives best utility score will be used.
In the actual optimization, we can make small changes
to more parameters, namely, γ, and in different steps i, the
number of users n[i], and the candidate size |Ci|. It is also
possible to use different η for each step, denoted by η[i]. It
turns out that slightly change in these parameters does not
affect the final result much. What affect utility the most is the
number of groups one needs to divide the users into. When η
is very small, the overall utility will deteriorate a lot.
As a result, in most of the system settings, the optimal
configuration is γ = log2 k, and for all i, |Ci| = k, η[i] = η,
n[i] ≈ n/g, where η is the maximal integer such that the
total number of queries 2γ+η · g (g = ⌈m−γη ⌉) is less than the
limit. In some extreme cases, e.g., when k is very big, |Ci| is
smaller than k, suggesting that when k is too large, since it is
impossible to accurately recover k heavy hitters, one should
simply try to find fewer. On the other hand, when k is small,
|Ci| can be large, so that the probability prefixes of the heavy
hitters are included in Ci are increased.
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D. Observations and Design Principles
By the optimization and the supporting analysis, we are
able to answer the questions raised in the beginning of this
section. Specifically, we make some statements that can help
guide the design of protocols for not only the heavy hitter
problem but also other LDP problems.
First of all, PEM assigns users to different groups, and let
each user report a prefix. It is possible to design PEM such that
requires each user answer all prefixes. Since all prefixes from
the same value are obviously related, correlation information
can be extracted. By (5), we observe the following:
Proposition 1: By partitioning the users into groups and
letting each group answer a separate question, the identification
probability will be higher than having each user split privacy
budget to answer all the questions.
We provide a proof to support our choice in the appendix.
We note that a similar observation has been made in [30],
based on comparing variances of frequency estimation. We can
generalize these observations into the following principle for
designing effective LDP protocols.
Principle 1: In LDP setting, one should divide the user
population, instead of dividing the privacy budget.
We note that in the centralized DP setting, these are generally
equivalent in terms of utility.
From numerical computation of optimal parameters, we
make the following observations.
Observation 1: Within the query limit, greatest identifica-
tion probability is achieved with the least number of groups.
This implies that, when multiple groups are necessary, η
should be as big as possible (within query limit). We distill
this as a second principle for designing LDP protocols.
Principle 2: When designing LDP protocols, one should
minimize the number of groups one has to divide the user
population into, as a large group size is a key in obtaining
accurate answers.
A similar principle applies in the centralized setting as well.
By reducing the number of steps that need privacy budget, one
can often achieve better results. In PEM, in order to increase
the final utility, it is inclined to allocate more users to the
final group, or minimize work by reduce η in the final phase.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, a more balanced allocation will
be better.
Observation 2: If η[i] = m/g, best result is achieved when
n[i] = n/g. Similarly, if n[i] = n/g, best result is achieved
when η[i] = m/g.
The previous observation is made when one of n[i] and
η[i] is balanced (i.e., n[i] = n/g or η[i] = m/g). When
either is unbalanced (perhaps due to e.g., the leftover bits
in the final phase), theoretical optimal allocation of the other
is unknown. These observations cannot be proven easily. We
provide empirical support in the next section (specifically,
Figure 3).
V. VALIDATION OF ANALYSIS
In this section, we run empirical experiment to validate
the analysis. That is, we want to show the analysis matches
empirical results (mainly (4) and (5)). Moreover, we verify the
design principles we made as observations in Section IV-D.
We generate synthetic datasets follows zipf’s distribution
(i.e., the j-th most frequent value has frequency fj proportional
to 1j1.5 ). The values of the heavy hitters are random. We
then evaluate PEM on the synthetic datasets with reasonable
parameters. All experiment runs 100 times. For each setting,
we use points with error bar (if any) for empirical results,
and a thin line with the same color for analytical results. The
validation is carried out in the following three stages.
A. Identification Probability.
We first verify the correctness of the identification prob-
ability (i.e., (5)). We generate n = 100000 data points each
with m = 64 bits. Users report with privacy budget ǫ = 1.
Note that with m = 64 bits or more, it is not feasible
to estimate the whole domain in a single round. For the
purpose of demonstration, we instantiate PEM with γ = 5, η =
10, |Ci| = 32.
In Figure 2, we show the identification probability of values
with different frequencies. We observe that, first of all, the
analysis matches the empirical result pretty well. Moreover,
when the other parameters remain the same, the more users
(larger n), the shorter the domain length (smaller m), or the
larger the privacy budget (larger ǫ), the better the overall result.
This trend also matches the analysis.
B. Utility Scores under Different Configurations.
Having verified the analytical identification probability (5)
for each single value, we now verify the analytical utility
score (4), which is the linear combination of the identification
probabilities for each heavy hitter.
We generate n = 100000 data points each represented by
m = 16 bits, and use ǫ = 1. Besides the zipfs distribution,
we also test on another similar distribution, ‘zipfs(-20)’. The
difference is that in zipfs(-20), the most frequent 20 values
are dropped. As a result, the first few heavy hitters are not
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Fig. 2. Overall identification probabilities for values with different frequencies. Dots represent empirical results, and lines shows analytical results. We fix
n = 1000000, ǫ = 1, m = 64 as the default setting. In each sub-figure, we vary one of them while keeping the others.
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Fig. 3. Utility score from different configurations. We fix k = 16, and use the default configuration of n = 100000, m = 16, ǫ = 1. In each sub-figure, we
vary r, s[1], n[1], and plot F1, NCR for two distributions.
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 500000
 1x106  1.5x106
F1
/N
CR
n
F1,zipfs
F1,zipfs(-20)
NCR,zipfs
NCR,zipfs(-20)
(a) Vary n
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 50  100  150  200  250
F1
/N
CR
m
F1,zipfs
F1,zipfs(-20)
NCR,zipfs
NCR,zipfs(-20)
(b) Vary m
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1  1.2  1.4  1.6  1.8
F1
/N
CR
ε
F1,zipfs
F1,zipfs(-20)
NCR,zipfs
NCR,zipfs(-20)
(c) Vary ǫ
Fig. 4. Utility score from the optimal configuration. We fix k = 32, and use the default configuration of n = 1000000, m = 64, ǫ = 1. In each sub-figure,
we vary n,m, ǫ, and plot F1, NCR for two distributions.
that significantly frequent, but the following ones occurs more
frequently.
The domain of this dataset is made smaller mainly for
the purpose of making it clear when we compare different
configurations of PEM. We plot F1 and NCR scores of the top
k = 16 heavy hitters in Figure 3. It can be seen that all points
(empirical results) lie on the line (analytical results), verifying
that the analysis is accurate under different configurations.
Specifically, in Figure 3(a), we vary the number of rounds
from 1 to 6, each outputting 16 candidates. As a result, with
more rounds of test, the overall result becomes worse. This
also validates principle (Observation 1) to have as few rounds
as possible.
To support Observation 2, we fix |Ci| = k = 16, γ = 4
and g = 2, we run two sets of experiment. In the first one,
we assign half of the users to each group, and vary segment
size of the first round. It can be seen from Figure 3(b) that
when η[1] = 6 (both rounds analyzes a domain of 210 values),
the overall result is optimal. Moreover, the result is symmetric
on η[1] = 6 (since γ = 4, the effective number of bits to
examine is 12). This is also the same as what we expect. In
the second experiment, we fix η = 6 and try different user
allocations , i.e., n[1]. As shown in Figure 3(c), when each of
the two rounds receives half of the users, the overall result is
maximized. Similar to the result for segment size, the result is
symmetric on n[1] = 50000.
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C. Optimal Utility Scores under Different Scenarios.
Now we verify the correctness of the optimal configuration
under different scenarios. We use the default setting of n =
1000000,m = 64, ǫ = 1, and plot F1 and NCR values of
optimal PEM, varying any of n,m, and ǫ. The configuration is
optimized taking F1 as the goal.
From Figure 4, we can first confirm analysis still matches
empirical results well. When the setting is not “favorable” (ǫ is
small, n is small, or m is large), zipfs distribution has better
results, while zipfs(-20) gives similar or better result on the
other extreme. The reason is that, when m is large and ǫ, n
are not sufficiently big, the noise in PEM is large. In zipfs
distribution, the first several heavy hitters are more significant,
and therefore, the overall utility score is better. While on the
other hand, it is possible to recover more heavy hitters. The
following several heavy hitters in zipfs(-20) distribution, which
are more frequent, contribute more to the overall result.
VI. EVALUATION
Now we discuss experiments that evaluate different pro-
tocols. Basically, we want to answer the following questions:
First, how many heavy hitters can be effectively identified.
Second, how much improvement is PEM over existing proto-
cols. Finally, what are the effects of different design choices
in PEM.
A. Evaluation Setup
Each experiment is run 10 times, and the average and
standard deviation are reported.
Datasets. The following three datasets are used. We assume
the zipf’s distribution when optimizing PEM. Note that in the
real world, auxiliary information (heavy hitter dictionary) may
exist to help improve the result. For example, the system
BLENDER [4] is proposed to work under the assumption that
a certain amount of users will participate in a centralized DP
protocol to find out the dictionary of heavy hitters. However,
our focus is on the case where there is no additional dictionary
or the heavy hitters are changing frequently so that existing
dictionaries are not reliable to provide up-to-date information.
1. Frequent URL. In SPM [17], the authors synthesized
one million urls from a confidential distribution of only 100
websites. The urls are fixed to be 20 bytes (160 bits) long
(padding or truncating if needed). We mimic the distribution
by collecting a similar dataset from Quantcast [2]. The dataset
contains domain name and monthly visited people of the 80
thousand most frequently visited websites. We limit urls to 20
bytes and limit the analysis to a 5-minute period, resulting a
dataset containing 1.2 million data points, and 27 thousand
unique urls.
This also motivates a real-world application, where the
analyst can find out the most popular website. In a previous
report of RAPPOR [14], the system collects homepage urls
from users, by testing on a known list of websites. We focus on
the scenario where the dictionary is unavailable or inaccurate.
2. Query Trends. The AOL dataset contains user queries
on AOL website during the first three months in 2006. Similar
to the settings of [4], we assume each user reports one query
(w.l.o.g., the first query). The queries are limited to be 6
bytes long. This results a dataset of around 0.5 million queries
including 0.2 million unique ones.
Many real-world application such as keyword trends or hot
tags can be derived from this example. In these scenarios, the
heavy hitters change frequently, such that the dictionary from
history may not be reliable.
3. Synthetic Dataset. We generate a synthetic dataset of
n = 1000000 data points following the exponential distribution
(also known as geometric distribution). The values (heavy
hitters) are randomly distributed. Each value is represented by
m = 64 bits. The exponential scale is 0.05, which is close to
the experimental setting in [14].
Competitors. We consider the following algorithms: PEM,
MCM, and SPM. In order to optimize PEM, we assume a zipf’s
distribution, limit the number of queries to the frequency
estimator to 220, and take F1 as the goal.
Both SPM and MCM were designed to find heavy hitters
based on threshold, but PEM works for top k heavy hitters.
For a fair comparison, we improve MCM and SPM in step 1
and 2, and change them from threshold based algorithms to
top k based in step 3. Note that PEM can also be changed to
work for threshold. The corresponding results are shown in
Section VI-B3.
1. Replace LDP primitive. Existing methods use non-
optimal LDP primitives, but they can be changed. Specifically,
SPM use RAPPOR [14] as the internal LDP primitive, and
MCM uses BLH. We replace RAPPOR and BLH with OLH to
improve their efficiency.
2. Reduce Number of Groups. For the url dataset, SPM
specifies one segment length to be two bytes. But for other
domain length, there is no clear specification as to how long
each segment should be. Guided by Observation 1, we make
the segment length as long as possible, under the frequency
oracle query limit.
MCM uses n1.5 channel, which is infeasible in many sce-
narios. We observe that collision of other non-frequent values
does not effect much, and propose to use k1.5 channels.
3. Replace Threshold Test. Existing methods require
internal test and filtering based on a threshold. Specifically,
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there is a final testing phase on all the identified values. Only
those tested above a threshold will be returned. We replace this
constraint by releasing the top k values for a fair comparison.
In SPM, moreover, each segment or segment-pair will be
identified if its frequency is estimated above a threshold. We
relax this by limiting exactly k patterns in each segment.
This ensures to identify at least k heavy hitters. For the
location-pairs, we keep adding segment-pairs until more than
k candidates are identified.
B. Detailed Results
1) Effect of ǫ: We show F1 and NCR results of different
methods varying ǫ in Figure 5. It is clear that PEM performs
best among all three protocols. When ǫ increases, the number
of heavy hitters that can be identified will increase. The
improvement is more significant when ǫ is larger.
When ǫ = 4, PEM achieves F1 = 0.9, meaning that more
than ten frequent URLs can be identified; on the other hand,
MCM and SPM can only identify two.
2) Effect of k: Figure 6 gives F1 and NCR results of
different methods varying k. Similarly, we can see that PEM
outperforms MCM and SPM. Note the correlation between F1
and NCR is close: a protocol with better F1 score will also
have a better NCR score. Thus, from now on, we ignore the
NCR scores.
For most of the cases, utility scores decrease with k, since
the less frequent values are harder to identify. In the synthetic
dataset, PEM achieves almost full utility for up to k = 30.
On the other hand, in some cases, as k increases, the absolute
number of heavy hitters that can be identified stops increasing.
This is because the task becomes hard so that even with more
guesses, it is still hard to find .
3) Comparison of Threshold Version: Both SPM and MCM
use internal threshold test to find heavy hitters. In this section,
we modify PEM in order to identify heavy hitters with frequen-
cies above a threshold θ. Note that each threshold value θ can
be translated into a corresponding k value. The lower the θ,
the bigger the k is.
Similar to the previous section, we also show results vary-
ing ǫ and θ. For brevity, we only show F1 for the Exponential
dataset in Figure 7. The results are similar in other datasets.
As can be seen from Figure 7(a), when we fix θ = 0.023
(0.023 is around frequency of the 16-the most frequent value
in the dataset), PEM performs better than SPM and MCM. This
advantage is most profound when ǫ = 2, where PEM achieves
performs much better than existing methods. The effects of
fixing ǫ and varying θ are also demonstrated in Figure 7(b)
and 7(c).
4) Effect of Partitioning Users: We further improve exist-
ing algorithms according to Proposition 1. Namely, instead
of split privacy budget, we allocate 10% of users for the
final testing. The result shown in Figure 8(a) demonstrates
the advantage of partitioning users. Especially, when ǫ = 1.2,
the original MCM method achieves F1 less than 0.2, while the
new version achieves nearly 0.8. For brevity, we only show F1
score on Exponential dataset, but the trend is similar in other
settings.
5) Effect of η: In Figure 8(b), we demonstrate the effect
of segment size, i.e., η, in PEM. We fix η = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and
plot the results. It is clear that when η increases, the overall
utility is better. When ǫ = 0.9, we see the F1 score is 0.4
when η = 2, and 0.8 when η = 10. Note that there should
be a limit on how large η can be, that is, η is limited by the
number of queries the aggregator can make.
6) Comparison of Estimation Accuracy: Having demon-
strated that PEM achieves better utility (no matter F1 or NCR
scores), we compare the estimation accuracy. We use the
average squared error as the metric, that is,
Var =
1
|CT ∩ Cg|
∑
v∈CT∩Cg
(nv − n˜v)2 ,
where nv is the true count of v and n˜v is its estimation by
the protocol. Note that we only account heavy hitters that are
successfully identified by the protocol, i.e., v ∈ CT ∩ Cg .
Figure 9 shows comparison of estimation variance for
different methods. Observe that the MCM method has smaller
variance than SPM, because the final testing step of MCM
uses half of the ǫ, while that of SPM uses one third. As a
comparison, PEM uses only the last group, which is one sixth
of users, and achieves similar estimation accuracy. Note that
this also complies with (3), the estimation variance of OLH.
7) Effect of Distribution Assumption: In the experiment,
to mimic the blindness of the distribution, we use a zipf’s
distribution to optimize PEM. Note that in practice, it is hard
to know the real distribution of the dataset. The task of getting
an accurate distribution is therefore left to the practitioners.
Here, we argue that except in extreme cases, the influence of
a poor assumption to the final result is not much. As we can
see from Figure 8(c), under different assumptions, the results
are very similar.
VII. RELATED WORK
Differential privacy has been the de facto notion protecting
privacy. In the centralized settings, many DP algorithms have
been proposed (see [13] for a theoretical treatment and [22]
in a more practical perspective). Recently, Uber has deployed
a system enforcing DP during SQL queries [20], Google
also proposed several works that combine DP with machine
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Fig. 5. Evaluation of the datasets, vary ǫ while fixing k = 16.
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Fig. 6. Evaluation of the datasets, varying k while fixing ǫ = 2.
learning [3], [27]. In the local setting, we have also seen
real world deployment: Google deployed RAPPOR [14] as
an extension within Chrome, and Apple [1] also uses similar
methods to help with predictions of spelling and other things.
Of all the problems, the basic tools in LDP are mechanisms
to estimate frequencies of values. Wang et al. compare different
mechanisms using estimation variance [30]. They conclude
that when the domain size is small, the Generalized Ran-
dom Response provides best utility, and Optimal Local Hash
(OLH)/Optimal Unary Encoding (OUE) [30] when the domain
is large. There also exists other mechanisms with higher
variance: RAPPOR by Erlingsson et al. [14] and Random
Matrix Projection (BLH) by Bassily and Smith [6]. These
protocols use ideas from earlier work [10], [25]. Kairouz et
al. [21] prove the optimal mechanisms are extreme.
The heavy hitter problem is to identify frequent values
when the domain of possible values is very large, so that it
is infeasible to obtain estimations for all values to identify
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Fig. 7. Evaluation of the synthetic datasets, vary one of ǫ and θ while fixing the other. m = 64, n = 1000000.
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Fig. 8. Evaluation of the synthetic datasets, vary ǫ. m = 64, n = 1000000. F1 is plotted.
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Fig. 9. Evaluation of the synthetic datasets, vary ǫ. m = 64, n = 1000000.
which ones are frequent. The problem has been studied in
the centralized DP setting [7], [24]. The basic idea is to use
sketches to store the heavy hitters and their counts, and then
publish the results with some noise. However, in the local
setting, it is not even possible to get the candidates. One
existing solution is SPM [17]. Hsu et al. [18] and Mishra
et al. [25] also provide efficient protocols for heavy hitters,
but the error bound is proved higher than MCM, proposed by
Bassily and Smith [6]. In this paper, we compare with MCM [6]
and SPM [17].
After we finish this work, we also found a simultaneous
paper [5] by Bassily et al. This paper proposes two methods
to handle the heavy hitter problem. The first method is similar
to our PEM protocol except that each group of users report on
one incremental bit. This divides users into m groups. Since
this line of work is motivated by the applications where m is
large, dividing the population into m groups will result in poor
accuracy. This violates one key observation we made in this
paper: the key to improve accuracy is to reduce the number of
groups. (Principle 2)
The other method is basically the MCM method with only√
n channels (instead of n1.5 channels, as suggested in [6]).
In our experimental comparison with MCM, we already use
around
√
n channels for MCM, and it significantly under-
perform our proposed method. The two methods are proven
to provide similar utility guarantees with similar complexities.
No experimental comparison with SPM is conducted in [5].
Besides the heavy hitter problem, there are other problems
in the LDP setting that rely on mechanisms for frequency
estimation. One interesting problem is estimating frequencies
of itemsets [15], [16]. Nguyeˆn et al. [26] studied how to
report numerical answers. Chen et al. [9] uses BLH to learn
location from users. Wang et al. [29] uses random response
and RAPPOR together for learning weighted histogram. Qin
et al. [28] estimate frequent items using RAPPOR and BLH,
where each user has a set of items. Solutions to these problems
can be improved by insights gained in our paper.
Avent et al. [4] propose a system that combines the
centralized and local version of DP together and finds heavy
hitters. This work is different from ours: The dictionary of
heavy hitters is constructed by a group of users who participate
in the centralized version of DP. LDP is used only to provide
additional information afterwards.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose LDP protocols that finds out
heavy hitters in a large domain. The utility of the protocols
are thoroughly analyzed and optimized. During analysis, we
identify several design principles that can potentially serve
as guidelines when solving other LDP problems. Finally, we
verify the correctness of analysis and strength of the new
methods using empirical experiment on both synthetic and
real-world datasets.
Current solutions rely heavily on the distribution. If the dis-
tribution is unfavorable, the result will be poor. One interesting
problem to explore would be to find protocols that works well
for any distribution. Another current limitation is that all the
protocol proposed require the domain to be fixed. It would be
interesting to find heavy hitters in an unbounded domain. It is
also an interesting direction to explore the possibility of using
domain-specific knowledge to improve the protocol.
REFERENCES
[1] “Apple’s ’differential privacy’ is about collecting your data-but not
your data,” https://www.wired.com/2016/06/apples-differential-privacy-
collecting-data/, 2016.
[2] “Quantcast top sites,” https://www.quantcast.com/top-sites/, 2016.
[3] M. Abadi, A. Chu, I. Goodfellow, H. B. McMahan, I. Mironov,
K. Talwar, and L. Zhang, “Deep learning with differential privacy,” in
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security. ACM, 2016, pp. 308–318.
[4] B. Avent, A. Korolova, D. Zeber, T. Hovden, and B. Livshits, “Blender:
Enabling local search with a hybrid differential privacy model,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1705.00831, 2017.
[5] R. Bassily, K. Nissim, U. Stemmer, and A. Thakurta, “Practical locally
private heavy hitters,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.04982, 2017.
[6] R. Bassily and A. Smith, “Local, private, efficient protocols for succinct
histograms,” in Proceedings of the Forty-Seventh Annual ACM on
Symposium on Theory of Computing. ACM, 2015, pp. 127–135.
[7] T.-H. H. Chan, M. Li, E. Shi, and W. Xu, “Differentially private
continual monitoring of heavy hitters from distributed streams.” in
Privacy Enhancing Technologies, vol. 7384. Springer, 2012, pp. 140–
159.
[8] T.-H. H. Chan, E. Shi, and D. Song, “Optimal lower bound for
differentially private multi-party aggregation.” in ESA. Springer, 2012,
pp. 277–288.
[9] R. Chen, H. Li, A. K. Qin, S. P. Kasiviswanathan, and H. Jin,
“Private spatial data aggregation in the local setting,” in 32nd IEEE
International Conference on Data Engineering, ICDE 2016, Helsinki,
Finland, May 16-20, 2016, 2016, pp. 289–300. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICDE.2016.7498248
[10] J. C. Duchi, M. I. Jordan, and M. J. Wainwright, “Local privacy and
statistical minimax rates,” in FOCS, 2013, pp. 429–438.
[11] C. Dwork, “Differential privacy,” in ICALP, 2006, pp. 1–12.
[12] C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim, and A. Smith, “Calibrating noise
to sensitivity in private data analysis,” in TCC, 2006, pp. 265–284.
[13] C. Dwork and A. Roth, “The algorithmic foundations of
differential privacy,” Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer
Science, vol. 9, no. 3-4, pp. 211–407, 2014. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0400000042
[14] U´. Erlingsson, V. Pihur, and A. Korolova, “Rappor: Randomized aggre-
gatable privacy-preserving ordinal response,” in Proceedings of the 2014
ACM SIGSAC conference on computer and communications security.
ACM, 2014, pp. 1054–1067.
[15] A. Evfimievski, J. Gehrke, and R. Srikant, “Limiting privacy breaches
in privacy preserving data mining,” in PODS, 2003, pp. 211–222.
[16] A. Evfimievski, R. Srikant, R. Agrawal, and J. Gehrke, “Privacy
preserving mining of association rules,” in KDD, 2002, pp. 217–228.
[17] G. Fanti, V. Pihur, and U´. Erlingsson, “Building a rappor with the
unknown: Privacy-preserving learning of associations and data dictio-
naries,” Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PoPETS),
vol. issue 3, 2016, 2016.
[18] J. Hsu, S. Khanna, and A. Roth, “Distributed private heavy hitters,” in
International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming.
Springer, 2012, pp. 461–472.
[19] K. Ja¨rvelin and J. Keka¨la¨inen, “Cumulated gain-based evaluation of ir
techniques,” ACM Transactions on Information Systems (TOIS), vol. 20,
no. 4, pp. 422–446, 2002.
[20] N. Johnson, J. P. Near, and D. Song, “Practical differential privacy for
sql queries using elastic sensitivity,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.09479,
2017.
[21] P. Kairouz, S. Oh, and P. Viswanath, “Extremal mechanisms for local
differential privacy,” in Advances in neural information processing
systems, 2014, pp. 2879–2887.
[22] N. Li, M. Lyu, D. Su, and W. Yang, Differential Privacy: From Theory
to Practice, ser. Synthesis Lectures on Information Security, Privacy,
and Trust. Morgan Claypool, 2016.
[23] C. D. Manning, P. Raghavan, H. Schu¨tze et al., Introduction to infor-
mation retrieval. Cambridge university press Cambridge, 2008, vol. 1,
no. 1.
[24] D. Mir, S. Muthukrishnan, A. Nikolov, and R. N. Wright, “Pan-private
algorithms via statistics on sketches,” in Proceedings of the thirtieth
ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART symposium on Principles of database
systems. ACM, 2011, pp. 37–48.
[25] N. Mishra and M. Sandler, “Privacy via pseudorandom sketches,”
in Proceedings of the twenty-fifth ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART
symposium on Principles of database systems. ACM, 2006, pp. 143–
152.
[26] T. T. Nguyeˆn, X. Xiao, Y. Yang, S. C. Hui, H. Shin, and J. Shin,
“Collecting and analyzing data from smart device users with local
differential privacy,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.05053, 2016.
[27] N. Papernot, M. Abadi, U´. Erlingsson, I. Goodfellow, and K. Talwar,
“Semi-supervised knowledge transfer for deep learning from private
training data,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.05755, 2016.
[28] Z. Qin, Y. Yang, T. Yu, I. Khalil, X. Xiao, and K. Ren, “Heavy hitter
estimation over set-valued data with local differential privacy,” in CCS,
2016.
[29] S. Wang, L. Huang, P. Wang, H. Deng, H. Xu, and W. Yang, “Pri-
vate weighted histogram aggregation in crowdsourcing,” in Interna-
tional Conference on Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications.
Springer, 2016, pp. 250–261.
[30] T. Wang, J. Blocki, N. Li, and S. Jha, “Locally differentially private
protocols for frequency estimation.” in USENIX’17: Proceedings of
26th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium.
USENIX Association, 2017.
14
[31] S. L. Warner, “Randomized response: A survey technique for eliminat-
ing evasive answer bias,” Journal of the American Statistical Associa-
tion, vol. 60, no. 309, pp. 63–69, 1965.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof: Suppose we examine the value vj in round i. We
first expand Pidenj [i] in (5) with pj = p · fj + q · (1 − fj),
σ2j [i] = n[i]·pj ·(1−pj), µj [i] = n[i]·pj , σ20 [i] = n[i]·q·(1−q),
µ0[i] = n[i] · q, and (according to OLH) p = 12 , q = 1eǫ+1 :
Φ

µj [i] + Φ−1
(
k−j
N [i]
)
· σ0[i]− µ0[i]
σj [i]


=Φ

n[i]fj(p− q) + Φ−1
(
k−j
N [i]
)
·
√
n[i]q(1− q)√
n[i](q + fj(p− q))(1 − q − fj(p− q))


=Φ


√
n[i]fj(p− q)/
√
q(1− q) + Φ−1
(
k−j
N [i]
)
√
(q + fj(p− q))(1 − q − fj(p− q))/
√
q(1− q)


(using p− q = e
ǫ − 1
2(eǫ + 1)
, q(1− q) = e
ǫ
(1 + eǫ)2
)
=Φ


√
n[i]
fj(e
ǫ−1)
2eǫ/2
+Φ−1
(
k−j
N [i]
)
√
1 +
(
eǫ−1
eǫ/2
)2 fj
2
(
1− fj2
)

 (6)
Since Φ(·) is monotone, when comparing (6) under differ-
ent settings, it suffices to compare the value inside Φ(·). Sim-
plify this equation short notations: A = Φ−1
(
k−j
N [i]
)
< 0, B =
fj
2
(
1− fj2
)
, C =
fj
√
n[i]
2 , and E(ǫ) =
(
eǫ−1
eǫ/2
)2
. When
partitioning users, we have P1 =
A√
1+BE(ǫ)
+ C√
g/E(ǫ)+gB
;
when split privacy budget, we have P2 =
A√
1+BE(ǫ/g)
+
C√
1/E(ǫ/g)+B
The goal is to show P1 > P2.
It is easy to see that E(ǫ/g) < E(ǫ), and thus the sub-
tracted term of P1 is greater than P2. As to the first terms, note
that in practice, we care more about small fj , because values
with high frequency fj can always be identified. Therefore,
assuming B ∼ 0, P1 > P2 if E(ǫ/g) < E(ǫ)/g (this is proven
by induction on g in Lemma 1). Numerical calculation also
validate that P1 > P2 in most cases.
Lemma 1: E(ǫ/g) < E(ǫ)/g.
Proof: When ǫ = 0, E(ǫ/g) = E(ǫ)/g. When ǫ > 0, we
only needs to show the derivative of the right hand is greater:
define z =
√
eǫ/g.(√
E(ǫ)/g
)′
=
√
1
g
(
zg − 1
zg
)′
>
1
g
(
gzg−1 + rz−g−1
)
= zg−1 +
1
zg+1
>1 +
1
z2
=
(√
E(ǫ/g)
)′
The last step is proven by induction.
Simpler Joint Estimation for [17]
In SPM, in order to query a value pair from Ci×Cj where
1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ g, maximal likelihood estimation (MLE) is used.
MLE updates every possible combination via a loop, which
terminates only if the accumulated update amount is small.
This method is slow in practice. Here we introduce a simpler
method to recover the joint distribution:
Suppose in the group of n users who report on segments
i and j, na users have pattern a in segment i, n
b users have
pattern b in segment j, and nba users have patterns a and b
simultaneously in segments i and j, respectively. The expected
“support” this pattern pair a, b receive is
E[Iba] = n
b
a · p2 + (nb − nba) · pq + (na − nba) · pq
+(n− nb − na + nba) · q2,
where p = 12 and q =
1
eǫ+1 are the parameters used in OLH.
Note that we already have partial estimations n˜a and n˜b
on segment i and j, respectively, therefore, we can have the
estimated value of nba:
n˜ba =
Iba − (n˜a + n˜b) · q(p− q)− n · q2
(p− q)2
Given that n˜a and n˜b are unbiased, n˜ba is unbiased. In the
actual implementation, we use this method.
This method can be extended to multiple (more than two)
answers: Let V be a set of answers on different questions (e.g.,
V = {a, b} in the two pattern example),
n˜V =
IV −
∑n−1
i=0
[
˜n∗V (i)q
n−i(p− q)i
]
(p− q)n
where ˜n∗V (i) to denote the summation of joint estimation of
strings specified by all size i subsets of V , and n˜∗∅ = n.
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